By Malik Samuel

IN what may represent one of the most coordinated and destructive offensives in recent months, fighters from the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) reportedly inflicted casualties and equipment losses on Nigerian military forces across multiple locations in Borno State during a single night of attacks on 5 March 2026.

According to audiovisual operational claims disseminated by the Amaq News Agency and social media channels affiliated with the Islamic State, the insurgents claimed to have killed at least 16 soldiers and officers in the attacks. The following day, a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) detonated near Njimya village inside the Sambisa Forest, reportedly causing an additional 20 casualties among government forces and forcing troop withdrawal from the base.

If true, the human toll from these attacks is significant, and it represents only part of the operational impact. The more consequential dimension lies in the reported loss of military equipment. A compilation of data from the ISWAP claims shows that more than 53 vehicles were destroyed or captured, alongside 84 motorcycles that were seized or burned. The group also claimed to have captured a substantial cache of weapons, including 54 rifles, 20 machine guns, and eight heavy support weapons such as rocket-propelled grenade  launchers and mortars. Again, if true, such losses within a single operational cycle represent a logistical setback for a military already confronting constraints in equipment availability and maintenance.

Particularly notable is the capture of 71 motorcycles, reportedly taken largely during the Konduga attack. In the difficult terrain of the Sambisa Forest and surrounding areas, motorcycles remain a critical platform for insurgent mobility. They allow fighters to traverse narrow forest tracks, conduct rapid hit-and-run attacks, and circumvent established military checkpoints. The seizure of this number of motorcycles, therefore, not only deprives government forces of mobility assets but simultaneously replenishes and reinforces ISWAP’s own logistical capabilities, potentially strengthening its operational reach in the forest belt.

The geographical spread and timing of the attacks also highlight a high degree of coordination. Assaults were reportedly conducted against military positions in Jakana, Konduga, Mainok, and Marte during the same night. In parallel, diversionary actions occurred in Benisheikh, Kauri, and Dalori, bringing to seven the total attacks carried out in one night. Such a pattern suggests deliberate operational planning designed to stretch military response capacity, complicate command decisions, and limit the ability of security forces to reinforce threatened positions. The attacks illustrate the group’s ability to operate across multiple axes simultaneously, a capability associated with improved command, control, and battlefield intelligence.

These operations form part of what ISWAP’s “Burning of the Camps” campaign, an ongoing series of attacks launched in February 2025 targeting military bases across the Lake Chad Basin. Since its launch, bases belonging not only to Nigerian forces but also to regional militaries in Niger and Cameroon have been reportedly targeted. The campaign appears designed to systematically degrade fixed military positions, which insurgent strategists often view as both symbolic and logistical nodes of state authority in contested territories.

For the Nigerian military, the reported scale of equipment losses raises questions about force protection and base defence practices. The targeting of armoured vehicles – particularly in Marte, where insurgents reportedly employed rocket-propelled grenades – suggests that ISWAP has refined tactics aimed at neutralising the military’s most protected assets. When large numbers of vehicles are destroyed or captured within a short timeframe, the effects extend beyond the immediate battlefield. Logistics chains, troop mobility, reinforcement capacity, and patrol operations may all be affected for extended periods while replacements and repairs are organised.

At the beginning of 2026, the Nigerian military appeared to have regained momentum in the conflict following coordinated operations that dislodged ISWAP fighters from their stronghold in the Alagarno Forest. During those operations, troops reportedly destroyed detention facilities, workshops, and other logistical infrastructure used by the insurgents. The offensive was widely interpreted as a significant disruption to ISWAP’s operational networks and supply chains.

However, the group’s ability to recover from these losses and subsequently mount large-scale attacks indicates a worrisome degree of organisational resilience. The military needs to know that insurgent groups that maintain decentralised command structures and diversified supply networks like ISWAP can often absorb short-term setbacks and regenerate operational capacity relatively quickly. The recent attacks, therefore, illustrate how tactical defeats do not necessarily translate into long-term strategic weakening for insurgent organisations.

The Sambisa attack also reflects evolving battlefield tactics. ISWAP claimed that it employed an SVBIED as the decisive element of the assault. Fighters reportedly initiated an exchange of fire with government troops in order to fix their attention and limit their ability to manoeuvre. During this engagement, the suicide vehicle advanced toward the position before detonating. Such tactics – combining direct fire engagements with suicide operations – have been observed in several theatres associated with Islamic State-linked groups and are intended to overwhelm defensive positions by forcing simultaneous threats.

Another factor frequently cited in discussions of ISWAP’s tactical evolution is the role of foreign fighters. Fighters originating from North Africa, the Middle East, the Sahel, and occasionally Europe have reportedly contributed to knowledge transfer within the organisation. This transfer includes ideological reinforcement, training in explosives, operational planning, battlefield coordination, and the integration of new technologies into insurgent operations, such as the recent increase in the use of drones for attacks. Such contributions can strengthen organisational cohesion and introduce new tactical approaches drawn from other conflict theatres where Islamic State affiliates have operated.

Some of these foreign fighters have also been deployed alongside local fighters to the battlefield. The deployments, however, have produced casualties on the part of the foreign fighters. According to sources, at least 10 foreign fighters are believed to have been killed in the past two years during engagements with regional security forces. The latest such incident occurred in February 2026 during an operation by Cameroonian forces. Earlier, around July 2025, three foreign fighters were reportedly killed by Nigerian troops in Mallam Fatori in Abadam Local Government Area (LGA) of Borno State. Among those killed so far, according to the sources, is a Senegalese national who previously resided in Sweden before travelling to join ISWAP.

Recent developments have also coincided with the deployment of United States military personnel to Nigeria for training and security cooperation purposes. The presence of these troops raised expectations that Nigerian forces would benefit from enhanced training and intelligence support. Some local observers initially speculated that the recent surge in insurgent attacks might be linked to the deployment. However, experts have suggested that the timing is unrelated and instead reflects internal mobilisation dynamics within ISWAP.

According to these sources, the recent escalation may partly stem from renewed mobilisation among ISWAP fighters, reinforced by ideological messaging and battlefield motivation from experienced foreign fighters. Such mobilisation reportedly includes an increased willingness among some fighters to undertake suicide operations designed to prevent security forces from penetrating deeper into insurgent strongholds.

The recent attacks also highlight a broader strategic dynamic: insurgent groups often regain operational initiative when military pressure decreases or becomes less sustained. The timing of the current wave of attacks appears to coincide with a period during which Nigerian military offensives have slowed relative to earlier operations in the year. In such circumstances, insurgent organisations can exploit the opportunity to regroup, replenish supplies, and launch counter-offensives intended to reassert battlefield momentum.

Another persistent concern relates to the insurgents’ acquisition of weapons. For more than a decade, attacks on military bases have been one of the principal ways through which ISWAP and other insurgent groups have obtained arms, ammunition, and vehicles. The capture or destruction of military equipment therefore has implications beyond immediate tactical losses. It risks strengthening insurgent arsenals and sustaining their ability to conduct further operations.

This dynamic also raises concerns regarding the potential diversion of externally supplied military equipment, notably those recently acquired from the United States. If military bases remain vulnerable to large-scale raids, there is a risk that some of these assets could ultimately be captured and repurposed by ISWAP. Strengthening base fortifications, early-warning systems, and rapid-response capabilities therefore remains a critical component of efforts to prevent equipment capture and reduce the operational advantages ISWAP currently enjoys.

• Malik Samuel is a senior researcher at Good Governance Africa-Nigeria. Before joining GGA, he was a researcher with the Institute for Security Studies, specialising in the Boko Haram conflict in the Lake Chad Basin Region.