A FEDERAL High Court in Abuja has granted bail to former Kaduna State governor, Nasir El-Rufai, in the sum of N100 million over allegations bordering on unlawful interception of telephone conversations involving the National Security Adviser (NSA), Nuhu Ribadu.
The presiding judge, Joyce Abdulmalik, granted the bail on Monday, May 16, with several conditions, including the provision of one surety in like sum.
The court ordered that the surety must reside in either Maitama or Asokoro districts of Abuja and deposit the original Certificate of Occupancy of a landed property with the court registry.
Abdulmalik further held that the surety must be a federal civil servant not below Grade Level 17 and provide evidence of salary payments for at least three months, alongside a letter of authentication from the manager of a bank within the court’s jurisdiction.
The court also directed the surety to depose an affidavit of means, enter into a bail bond, submit a recent passport photograph, and provide a verification letter from the surety’s department, as well as a tax clearance certificate covering the last six months.
As part of the conditions, El-Rufai was ordered to deposit all valid international passports with the court registry.
The judge further directed the former governor to report to the headquarters of the State Security Service (SSS) every last Friday of the month at 10 a.m. to sign an attendance register pending the determination of the case.
She warned that failure to comply with any of the conditions would lead to an automatic revocation of the bail.
The court additionally ordered El-Rufai to submit a letter of attestation from the chairman of the Kaduna Traditional Council.
The ICIR earlier reported that the SSS arraigned El-Rufai before the Federal High Court on April 23 over alleged unlawful interception of Ribadu’s phone conversations and other alleged breaches of national security laws.
The charges were amended from three to five counts during resumed proceedings before the judge – Abdulmalik. El-Rufai pleaded not guilty to all the charges.
His legal troubles stemmed from comments he made during an interview on Arise Television in February, where he claimed that he became aware of an alleged directive by Ribadu for his arrest through tapped phone conversations.
“The government thinks that they’re the only ones that listen to calls… Someone tapped his phone,” El-Rufai had said during the interview.
Aside from the SSS case, the former governor is also facing separate corruption-related charges instituted by the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) before Kaduna State and Federal High Courts.
The ICPC accused El-Rufai of offences including alleged abuse of office, diversion of public funds, money laundering, unlawful award of contracts, and approving payments for projects allegedly not executed during his tenure as governor between 2015 and 2023.
In one of the cases, prosecutors alleged that he approved the payment of about N11 billion to a company for a Kaduna light rail project that “was never executed”, while another charge accused him of unlawfully receiving severance benefits exceeding approved entitlements.
El-Rufai denied all the allegations in the cases and pleaded not guilty.
On April 14, The ICIR reported that after hearing both sides, the court granted bail to the former governor. The court granted him N100 million bail with sureties, including conditions that he must provide responsible guarantors, among others.
OYO State Governor, Seyi Makinde, on Sunday, May 17, revealed that seven teachers were kidnapped during attacks on schools in Oriire Local Government Area of the state.
The governor also said one of the victims was killed.
The ICIR reports that gunmen stormed communities along the Ahoro-Esiele/Yawota axis in Oriire, Ogbomoso, on Friday, May 15, and attacked schools, including Community High School, Ahoro-Esiele, L.A. Primary School, Esiele, and Yawota Baptist Nursery and Primary School, abducting both staff and pupils.
Briefing journalists on the security situation in the state, Makinde explained that he had met with security chiefs and heads of relevant agencies to assess rescue strategies for the abductees.
According to him, intelligence gathered so far shows that an Islamic Studies teacher lost his life during the attack, while security operatives have arrested six people within the affected communities and another three persons considered to have links with the attacks.
He linked the attack to insecurity in neighbouring states, noting that insurgents and other criminals fleeing military onslaughts could have moved into the state.
“With the pressure on the terrorists and the bandits in the North-West, they will keep moving southward,” the governor said.
Makinde further disclosed that preliminary investigations indicate that some of those arrested might have played crucial roles as informants assisting the attackers from within the local communities.
He assured residents that efforts were ongoing to rescue the victims safely.
THE AAAS Kavli Science Journalism Awards is accepting entries for its 2026 awards. The contest year is from July 16, 2025, to July 15, 2026, with a contest entry deadline of August 1, 2026.
Entrants may submit up to three entries in all categories, which include print/online, audio, video and children’s science news.
In each category, there are two awards: Gold, with a prize of $5,000, and Silver, with a prize of $3,500.
The deadline for applications is August 1, 2026. Interested applicants can apply here.
THE Defence Headquarters (DHQ) has announced the continuation of coordinated military operations with the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) against Islamic State (ISIS) fighters in Nigeria’s North-East, with fresh airstrikes reportedly killing more than 20 militants in the Metele area of Borno State.
In a statement on Monday, May 16, the Director of Defence Information, Samaila Uba, said the strikes were carried out following intelligence on the “convergence and migration” of terrorist fighters within the region.
According to the military, the latest operation formed part of sustained offensives aimed at dismantling terrorist networks and denying insurgents safe havens across the country.
“The ongoing operations follow the neutralisation of ISIS commander Abu-Bilal al-Minuki and are part of sustained efforts to disrupt terrorist networks, remove them from the battlefield and deny the terrorists any safe haven within Nigeria,” the statement read.
The DHQ stressed that the Armed Forces of Nigeria would continue aggressive operations to defend the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
“There will be no safe haven for all terrorists anywhere in Nigeria,” the statement added.
The announcement came as AFRICOM separately confirmed that US forces coordinated additional “kinetic strikes” with the Nigerian government on May 17 against ISIS targets in North-Eastern Nigeria.
A statement by AFRICOM Public Affairs on Monday, noted that the US military command said intelligence confirmed that the targets were ISIS militants, while post-strike assessments were still ongoing.
“No U.S. or Nigerian forces were harmed,” AFRICOM stated.
The command said the operation was aimed at weakening the terror group’s ability to plan attacks against both Nigeria and allied nations.
“The removal of these terrorists diminishes the group’s capacity to plan attacks that threaten the safety and security of the U.S. and our partners,” the statement stressed.
AFRICOM also reiterated its commitment to supporting partner nations with “specialized U.S. capabilities” to tackle shared security threats.
The latest strikes follow an earlier joint operation on May 16, during which Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, described as ISIS second-in-commander globally, was reportedly killed in another coordinated strike in the North-East.
“Tonight, at my direction, brave American forces and the Armed Forces of Nigeria flawlessly executed a meticulously planned and very complex mission to eliminate the most active terrorist in the world from the battlefield,” Donald Trump wrote on his social media handle.
According to him, the operation was carried out in Africa with support from intelligence sources tracking the activities of the terror leader.
“Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, second in command of ISIS globally, thought he could hide in Africa, but little did he know we had sources who kept us informed on what he was doing,” he added.
The ICIR reports that both developments came days after Nigeria deepened its counterterrorism engagement with the US following a high-level meeting in Washington between the National Security Adviser, Nuhu Ribadu, and top US officials led by Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
According to a statement shared by Secure Nigeria, the meeting reinforced what it described as a “decisive U.S.-Nigeria partnership to confront terrorism in West Africa” amid growing extremist threats across the region.
THE Sir Harry Evans Global Fellowship is seeking applications for its programme which provides opportunity for exceptional early-career journalists.
Selected fellows will undertake a nine-month investigative project with Durham University and Reuters and will be mentored by top Reuters editors while having access to Durham’s academics and research resources. Fellows will be given the opportunity to develop rigorous, fact-based research and reporting skills.
Besides, the fellows will pursue the project from inside a Reuters newsroom in London, New York, Sydney or Toronto with the additional support of colleagues in Durham’s Institute of Advanced Studies. They will deliver a public seminar at the IAS, sharing their learnings from the fellowship and supporting the understanding of journalism at the University. The inaugural Sir Harry Evans Fellow, Waylon Cunningham, was part of a Reuters investigative team which won a 2024 Pulitzer Prize in national reporting.
The fellowship has a monthly salary of c.£4,444 per month (equivalent to a pro-rata salary of c.£53,333 per year). In addition, there is a £1,250 per month living stipend and a one-off payment of £1,800 for travel and related expenses.
Qualified applicants should have between two-and five-years’ professional journalism experience. Where a prospective applicant is not currently a journalist but has worked in an investigative reporting capacity in a related professional field (for example, working as an author or researcher on authoritative investigative work, or developing in-field photo or video research projects, documentaries, or exhibitions), applications may be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Applications close on 10 July 2026 at 12 noon BST. Applications received after the closing date will not be accepted. Interested applicants can apply here.
IN October 2025, Francis Ndung’u Ndarua left Nairobi for what he thought would be an engineering job in Russia. Then he vanished. Two months later, a video of Francis in military uniform surfaced online. With a landmine strapped to his chest, a Russian voice calls him a “can opener.” A February 2026 All Eyes On Wagner investigation documented 1,417 Africans enlisted in the Russian army since 2023. Fifty-one recruits died within their first month of the war. These recruitments were illegal under international and national laws. The United Nations Mercenary Convention prohibits the recruitment and training of foreign combatants. In Africa, Kenya and South Africa criminalize unauthorized foreign military and mercenary services. Recruiters did not translate contracts from Russian, and many recruits did not understand what they had signed. There is an urgent need to end Russia’s illegal recruitment of young Africans. African countries need to empower their citizens with the right information, provide viable alternatives for the youth, and address economic obstacles that leave youth susceptible to Russia’s recruitment.
Russia did not build its recruitment pipeline from scratch, but rather exploited the vulnerabilities that African countries had already created. South Africa’s 1998 Foreign Military Assistance Act criminalises unauthorised foreign military service. In 27 years, it has produced no convictions. The Organisation of African Unity’s 1977 Anti-Mercenarism Convention lacks the will for enforcement. Kenya closed 600 recruitment agencies, yet its intelligence service reported Russia has recruited about 1,000 of the former’s citizens.
Across the continent, there is a pattern of unenforced laws and unused conventions. Meanwhile, African countries produce millions of graduates with no viable path to employment or legal migration. Young Africans are dying in a war that is not theirs, under contracts that recruiters tricked them into. If governments in Africa cannot protect their citizens against foreign exploitation, they undermine the social contract on which their legitimacy depends. To allow another country to systematically exploit Africa’s human resources for its military and economic objectives is a concession of sovereignty. Countries that tolerate such exploitation are absent.
Russia’s recruitment pipeline runs on information asymmetry. Secret recruiters on Telegram channels promise monthly salaries of up to $3500, Russian citizenship, and noncombatant roles. The reality is passport confiscation and deployment to assault waves. Closing the information gap would be the fastest and rights-based intervention.
Recruits who survived and returned home are the most powerful voices in the fight against the pipeline. They represent exactly what Russian contracts deliver: unpaid wages, forced redeployment, and what Ukrainian officials call “meat assaults.” Their testimony should be the centrepiece of a continent-wide counter-recruitment effort, using the same platforms, Telegram and TikTok, that the recruiters use.
The best solution is not censorship or internet shutdowns, which African countries too often resort to. Instead, they should provide access to the right information. When the BBC documented recruiter Polina Azarnykh posting 490 invitations to African men through a single Telegram channel, it did more by disrupting the pipeline than any government directive.
Besides state regulation, transparency and public pressure are the tools that will hold media platforms accountable to the government. South Africa models transparency and public pressure. In August 2025, South African journalists and citizens exposed TikTok influencers promoting Alabuga’s drone factory as a career opportunity. Within days, widespread public reporting forced TikTok to ban the accounts permanently, and the government opened an investigation without passing a new law.
All Eyes on Wagner identified three groups that the pipeline targets. The first group is job seekers wanting work abroad, and the second is students seeking education overseas. The third group is the would-be migrants who were told that Russia is a route to Europe. These are rational people pursuing real aspirations through the only channels available to them. The solution is not to restrict those aspirations, but to offer better channels.
Kenya’s Diaspora Placement Agency (DPA) provides a free, verified overseas job database and transparent contracts. The DPA delivers exactly what Russia’s recruitment pipeline promises but fails to deliver. Every affected African country should create a similar system. The government should open such systems to private recruitment platforms and industries that can verify opportunities at scale.
Russia has expanded its government-sponsored scholarship program to over 5,000 African students for the 2025/2026 academic session. Ukraine’s foreign ministry warns these scholarships may mask Russia’s recruitment efforts. The response should not be to discourage study abroad but to build credible alternatives. For example, verified exchange programmes with transparent terms and consular protection built in.
Tighter borders do not help the situation. When Kenya airports increased scrutiny, recruiters rerouted through Istanbul and Abu Dhabi. African countries cannot suppress the demand for opportunity by restricting supply. Offering more beneficial options is the best way to contend with illegal recruiters. Countries that avoid competition are putting the citizens they are supposed to protect in grave danger.
A former Sierra Leonean soldier captured in Ukraine told PBS that Africans keep signing Russian recruitment contracts “because we have no hope.” That hopelessness is not a natural condition. Policy manufactured it, and policy can also undo it.
What is the Way Forward?
African countries should adopt three reforms. First, to help local startups, simplify business registration through a digital process. Rwanda implemented online business registration, and formal youth employment doubled Kenya’s rate. Kenya still requires days of agency visits. The difference is not geography. It is the decision by one government to break the norm and another’s choice to maintain it.
Second, secure property rights for young entrepreneurs. Across the continent, insecure land titles limit young people’s ability to build long-term projects, borrow against assets, and attract investment. African countries should fast-track digital land registration and simplify title transfers, starting in urban centres where recruitment pressure is highest. Young people who own assets have a reason to stay back.
Third, open labour markets to private competition. State monopolies channel opportunities to the rich and connected. Kenya’s DPA proved in real time that when the government offered verified work abroad, it created direct competition with Russia’s pipeline. Other African countries should replicate it and go further by licensing private recruitment firms, establishing industry-verified job boards, and partnering with destination countries to pre-clear work permits. Legitimate opportunities are the most effective counter-recruitment tool available. Each remaining barrier is a recruitment subsidy paid to the predator that offers a way out.
South Africa’s 61 percent youth unemployment, despite a relatively open economy, shows that economic freedom without adequate education and infrastructure is insufficient. But economic growth and prosperity remain the foundation. Without these changes, every other intervention is a patch on a wound that governments keep reopening.
Picture a young Kenyan with viable economic opportunities, a legal route to work abroad, and access to the testimony of those who survived Russia’s illegal recruitment. That young Kenyan would not board a flight based on a contract in a language he cannot read. African countries must set precedents against digital recruitment for foreign exploitation of every kind.They must build migration systems that protect rather than criminalise. African countries have spent months blaming Moscow, while the pipeline they built is still running. It is time tostop the blaming and start dismantling the economic barriers that make young Africans vulnerable to foreign exploitation.
Jack is an M.Sc. student at SOAS, studying Violence, Conflict and Development, and is currently on placement with African Liberty.
THE Lagos State Police Command has arrested six suspected members of a notorious “one chance” robbery syndicate allegedly operating around Ago Palace Way in Okota area of the state.
The arrests were made on Sunday, May 17, by operatives during a routine stop-and-search operation along the axis.
The suspects were intercepted while traveling in a tricycle with registration number AAA 720 QL during an active attempt to rob unsuspecting commuters.
According to a statement released by the state Police Public Relations Officer, Abimbola Adebisi, a superintendent of police, the suspects immediately fled the vehicle upon sighting the police.
“On sighting the police, the suspects reportedly jumped down and abandoned the tricycle. A cutlass allegedly used for their operations and a mobile phone were recovered at the scene.
“Further investigation led to the arrest of the six suspects identified as: Basiru Rilwan ‘m’, 23 years; Afeez Akeem ‘m’, 25 years; Ademola Yekeen ‘m’, 20 years; Sodipo Oyeyemi ‘m’, 27 years; Ayomide Gafar ‘m’; and Fabayo Michael ‘m’, 28 years. The suspects were found in possession of a dummy pistol allegedly used in carrying out their criminal activities. The suspects will be charged to court on completion of investigation.”
The command said under the leadership of the state Commissioner of Police, Tijani Fatai, it would sustain proactive policing strategies aimed at combating crime and ensuring the safety of residents across the state.
It also urged the public to continue to provide timely and credible information to aid its officers’ efforts to rid the state of criminal elements.
The ICIR reports that Lagos is one of Nigerian states with one chance criminal syndicates. The syndicates are a group of robbers who disguise as commercial motorists and passengers.
They often lure unsuspecting passengers into their vehicles and rob them of their belongings, including cash, phones and other valuables.
Many victims who resisted their attacks have been killed or severely injured. The criminals operate with weapons, including axes, cutlasses and guns. They also possess point-of-sale machines (PoS), which they use to force their victims to empty their bank accounts.
THE World Health Organization (WHO) has declared the Ebola outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), following rising deaths, infections among health workers, and confirmed cross-border transmission.
The declaration was made on May 16, 2026, by the WHO Director-General after consultations with affected countries and following laboratory confirmation of the outbreak in eastern DRC and imported cases in Uganda.
According to the statement, the outbreak began on May 5, 2026, when health authorities were alerted to a rapidly spreading illness with unusually high mortality in Mongbwalu Health Zone, Ituri Province.
It noted that early reports included deaths among health workers, prompting rapid investigation across Mongbwalu, Rwampara, and Bunia health zones.
It further noted that blood samples collected from affected areas on May 14, 2026, were analysed by the Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale (INRB) in Kinshasa, where laboratory testing confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) in eight of 13 samples on May 15.
Following confirmation, the DRC Ministry of Public Health, Hygiene and Social Welfare officially declared the country’s 17th Ebola disease outbreak.
“This is the 17th Ebola disease outbreak in the DRC since 1976. The last Ebola disease outbreak in the country was declared on 4 September 2025 with total of 64 cases (53 confirmed, 11 probable), including 45 deaths (CFR 70.3%), reported from six health areas in Bulape Health Zone, Kasai Province.
“The end of outbreak was declared on 1 December 2025. The last BVD outbreak was reported on 17 August 2012 by the DRC Ministry of Health in Province Orientale. A total of 59 cases, 38 confirmed and 21 probable cases, including 34 deaths were reported. The outbreak was declared over on 26 November 2012 by the MOH,” WHO wrote.
What the virus is and how it spreads
WHO explained that Bundibugyo virus disease is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola caused by the Bundibugyo virus, a member of the Orthoebolavirus genus. The virus is zoonotic in origin, with fruit bats believed to be the natural reservoir, and transmission to humans occurring through direct contact with infected wildlife or exposure to bodily fluids of infected persons, as well as contaminated surfaces.
The disease spreads further through close contact between individuals, particularly in healthcare settings where infection prevention measures are weak, and during unsafe burial practices.
The organisation noted that the incubation period ranges from two to 21 days, during which infected individuals are not yet contagious.
It warned that early symptoms are non-specific and often resemble malaria or other endemic infections, beginning with fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache and sore throat, before progressing in severe cases to vomiting, diarrhoea, organ failure and sometimes haemorrhaging.
WHO said this would make early detection difficult without laboratory testing.
Cases and spread in DRC and Uganda
In its statement, the global health body stressed that as of May 15, 2026, a total of 246 suspected cases and 80 deaths had been recorded across three health zones in Ituri Province — Rwampara, Mongbwalu and Bunia — with 24 patients in isolation.
The agency also reported that most suspected cases involve people aged between 20 and 39, with women accounting for more than 60 per cent of infections, suggesting significant household and caregiving transmission.
It added that Uganda’s Ministry of Health had also confirmed an outbreak after detecting imported cases linked to DRC, with no local transmission being detected in Uganda so far.
Challenges in containment
WHO said the outbreak was unfolding in a complex humanitarian and security environment in eastern DRC, where ongoing conflict in Ituri Province is restricting access for surveillance teams and delaying response operations.
The agency noted a four-week gap between the first suspected case and laboratory confirmation, which suggested a low index of suspicion among healthcare workers. It also reported breaches in infection prevention and control (IPC), particularly after several health workers became infected and died.
In addition, WHO said the region faced high population displacement, with more than 273,000 displaced people and nearly 1.9 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, further complicating outbreak control.
It stressed that there was no licensed vaccine or specific antiviral treatment for Bundibugyo virus disease.
“The case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks have ranged from 30 per cent to 50 per cent. Unlike Ebola virus disease, there is no licensed vaccine or specific therapeutics against Bundibugyo virus, though early supportive care is lifesaving,” the statement added.
It said management depends entirely on early detection, isolation of cases, aggressive supportive care such as fluid replacement and organ support, strict infection prevention and control in health facilities, safe and dignified burials, and intensive contact tracing for up to 21 days.
THE Nigeria Police Force (NPF) has confirmed the death of 17 of its officers following a terrorist attack on the Nigerian Army Special Forces School in Buni Yadi, Gujba Local Government Area of Yobe State.
In a statement on Saturday, May 16, by the Force Public Relations Officer, Anthony Placid, the Force said the officers were killed during an attack on the training institution in the early hours of May 8, 2026.
According to the statement, the officers were undergoing specialised operational training at the facility when terrorists launched what the NPF described as a coordinated assault from multiple directions at about 1:15 a.m.
It added that several personnel of the Nigerian Army also lost their lives while repelling the attack.
He expressed condolences to the families of the deceased officers, saying their sacrifices would not be forgotten.
“The officers, who were undergoing specialised operational training at the institution, lost their lives when terrorists launched a coordinated attack on the facility from multiple directions at about 0115hrs. Several gallant personnel of the Nigerian Army also made the ultimate sacrifice while courageously repelling the attack.
“The Inspector-General of Police, IGP, Olatunji Rilwan Disu, psc (+), NPM, described the fallen officers as courageous and dedicated personnel who demonstrated exceptional patriotism and commitment to national security through their participation in advanced counterterrorism and tactical training programmes. The IGP conveyed the heartfelt condolences of the entire Force to the bereaved families, assuring them that the sacrifices of the deceased officers will never be forgotten,” the statement added.
The IGP commended the resilience of the surviving officers and urged them to remain committed to completing the training programme in honour of their fallen colleagues.
The attack was part of the coordinated assault on military formation in Yobe State, which the troops of the Joint Task Force North-East Operation Hadin Kai claimed to have been repelled on May 7.
In a statement on May 8, after the incident, Operation Hadin Kai said fighters suspected to be members of the Islamic State West Africa Province attacked the headquarters of the 27 Brigade in Buni Gari and nearby military positions from multiple directions under the cover of darkness.
The military said troops, supported by the air component of the operation, repelled the assault, killing more than 50 terrorists, while recovering weapons and ammunition from fleeing insurgents.
Operation Hadin Kai also confirmed that two soldiers were killed during the encounter, while some military equipment, including Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles and gun trucks, sustained minimal damage.
Buni Yadi and surrounding communities in Gujba axis have repeatedly witnessed insurgent attacks over the years due to the activities of terrorist groups operating in Nigeria’s North-East region.
In its statement on Saturday, the NPF said it would continue to work with the armed forces and other security agencies to track down those responsible for the attack and bring them to justice.
IT was set up in 2011 as a unit of the Imo State Police Command to fight kidnapping, armed robbery, and cultism. Today, Tiger Base — as residents call it — stands accused of abuses that eclipse even the disbanded Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS). This ICIR investigation tracks how the unit uses surveillance tools to track, extort and torture citizens at its detention facility.
‘They seized my phone, accessed my messages, bank records’
A team of security operatives, reminiscent of Nazi Germany’s secret police, stormed his residence on a Saturday night. Jolted from sleep amid fear, he thought they were from the Department of State Services (DSS).
Chidiebere (name changed for protection) later realised they were from Tiger Base. They had tapped his calls and monitored his movements. He wasn’t told of his alleged offence, but said he paid heavily for his eventual release.
“I was a victim of illegal surveillance by Tiger Base. It was my first encounter with them. They earlier called me with hidden numbers, trying to lure me out for arrest, but I avoided the trap. They tracked me, got my address, and arrived at night in about five Sienna vehicles, shouting my name. They seized and went through my phone to confirm their target, accessing my messages, calls, and bank records.”
Chidiebere said he was taken to Tiger Base’s Owerri facility and detained for two months. “I was subjected to all forms of maltreatment and spent a lot of money on bail before being released. My experience shows how Nigerian security agencies track citizens and ‘kidnap’ them under the guise of arrest,” he lamented.
Chidiebere was lucky to have come out alive from Tiger Base’s dungeon. This reporter gathered that it was not the same for many other victims who allegedly died after being tracked, extorted and arrested by operatives of the anti-kidnapping unit.
A 2025 report by the Coalition Against Police Tiger Base Impunity (CAPTI) named Magnus Ejiogu as one of the victims. On a September evening in 2025, Ejiogu was tracked and arrested at a police checkpoint in Owerri. His family would never see him alive again. For over a month, they were denied any contact with him. His lawyers were turned away.
Even when Nigeria’s National Human Rights Commission wrote to the country’s top police hierarchy, warning that Ejiogu was being tortured and demanded his release, nothing happened. On October 27, more than a month thereafter, his family learned he had died in custody. Police claimed he fell ill, but his family suspects he was tortured to death.
Sometime in December last year, a “confessional interview” allegedly made by one Johnbosco Onuocha while in custody triggered controversy and concerns.
A businessman (printer), Onuocha, had allegedly been put under surveillance and eventually arrested on May 31, 2025, at his shop in Ekeziama, Ahiazu Mbaise LGA of Imo State. Posing as customers, the operatives handcuffed and took him away into detention at the Tiger Base facility in Owerri.
His business neighbours later contacted his family, and a desperate search began, moving from the Ahiazu Mbaise Police Division to Tiger Base, and finally to the Imo State Police Headquarters. At every point, the police denied having him in custody.
The family only learnt of his whereabouts after the State Police Public Relations Officer (PPRO), Henry Okoye, issued a statement claiming that Onuocha had been arrested following a gun battle with police operatives, during which he allegedly sustained gunshot injuries.
His sister, Collete, who visited Tiger Base to seek clarification, reportedly questioned the PPRO on how someone arrested openly in a market square could suddenly be described as having engaged in a gun battle with the police.
She said the PPRO claimed that the same detainee, said to have sustained gunshot injuries during a gun battle, was shot while attempting to escape by scaling the Tiger Base fence.
Chinonso Uba, popularly known as Nonsonkwa, an Owerri-based journalist and human rights activist, has also tasted the bitter pill of what many describe as the terror and surveillance exploitation of Tiger Base.
Uba, the President of Nchekwa Ndi Ogbenye Foundation (Protect the Weak International Foundation), spoke with The ICIR in Owerri. He said the anti-kidnapping unit was notorious for chronic human rights violations, including alleged extrajudicial killings of Imo youths profiled as IPOB members, “organ harvesting, enforced disappearance and extortion running into millions of naira.”
Alleging that digital and communication surveillance had been used against him following his activism, he said: “My Facebook profile and page with over 500,000 followers were disabled mysteriously,” adding: “My two phone numbers had been bugged, and my private calls infiltrated.”
Chinonso, who was detained twice in the facility, alleged that in Tiger Base, junior officers from the rank of Sergeant and Inspectors were amassing questionable wealth, building mansions and acquiring landed property.
“It is only in Tiger Base that you will see junior officers living flamboyantly even more than their senior counterparts like DSP elsewhere,” he said.
Back from Finland, detained at Tiger Base
Simon Chukwudi, an Imo State indigene, returned to Nigeria from Finland last December with a list of plans. Detention at Tiger Base wasn’t on it. Within a week, a family dispute with his younger brother got him tracked, arrested and locked up at the notorious unit.
After returning to Finland, Chukwudi posted a videodetailing his ordeal.It sounded like fiction from the 1980’s British horror series – Hammer House of Horror. Tiger Base, the police unit he named, deals in real horrors: “spying, brutality, and rights abuses.”
Chukwudi said: “Tiger Base is not a place for responsible citizens. I had a family issue with my younger brother that could be settled amicably. But he was ill-advised to report to Tiger Base. They tracked my movements, arrested, and detained me at their facility.
“I’m not a criminal. But they came in Sienna buses to arrest me like I’d planned a coup against President Tinubu. I was tortured. One of the officers was from my maternal community. I paid N500,000 to be released. I thank God I’m alive — most people don’t leave Tiger Base alive.”
CAPTI: Wiretapping used to seize detainees later found dead
Earlier this year, the Coalition Against Police Tiger Base Impunity (CAPTI) published a damning report documenting harrowing accounts from inside Tiger Base.
Titled, ‘Tiger Base Files’, the report — obtained by The ICIR — named 42 victims and documents allegations of at least 200 deaths in custody, enforced disappearances of adults and children, and systematic torture at the facility between 2021 and 26 December 2025.
Speaking with The ICIR, CAPTI’s coordinator, Juwon Sanyaolu, alleged the wrong use of surveillance equipment to track victims, lamenting that no officer had been held accountable.
He cited the case of Japhet Njoku, 32, a security guard tracked and arrested in March 2025 after he was accused of stealing ₦15 million at Alaba Market. He said the victim was held at Tiger Base for nearly two months, tortured, and told to pay ₦300,000 for release.
“He died in custody on May 5, 2025. His family learned of his death from a freed detainee, not police,” Sanyaolu said.
A concerned citizens group under the banner of OGANIHU had petitioned the state Governor Hope Uzodimma, demanding immediate suspension, thorough investigation of Tiger Base officers implicated, and their diligent prosecution.
The petition, dated February 23, 2026, and signed by Chijioke Uwasomba, a professor, and Chido Onumah, Coordinator of the African Centre for Media and Information Literacy (AFRICMIL), called on the relevant authorities to ensure that all detainees held at Tiger Base beyond constitutional limits are properly charged or released.
“Your Excellency, Tiger Base has become emblematic of a deeper crisis in policing accountability. Continued inaction risks escalating public anger and undermining confidence in government institutions. The experience of #EndSARS demonstrates the grave consequences of allowing abusive police units to operate without oversight. Imo State must not repeat that trajectory,” the petitioners said.
However, when contacted, the Imo State government denied knowledge of the petition. Declan Emelumba, the Commissioner for Information, said the State government could not comment on the activities of Tiger Base. “It is a police issue. So, you should be talking to the Police Public Relations Officer (PPRO), not the government,” Emelumba said.
‘How my clients were tracked, arrested’
Chinedu Agu, an Owerri-based lawyer and human rights activist, told The ICIR that he represents some suspects arrested and detained by Tiger Base, adding that some had been held since October 2023 and others since late 2024.
“They were accused of crimes we can’t prove they committed. Some were tracked and picked up just for links to a husband, boyfriend, or relative and slammed the charges – terrorism and arson.”
Chinedu Agu, lawyer to some Tiger Base detainees
Agu said surveillance gear was used to track and arrest his clients: “Four of the women were picked up at their homes in Okigwe. You don’t do that without surveillance.” He added that illegal tracking and spyware aren’t unique to Tiger Base, citing several other allegations of security agencies violating citizens’ privacy rights.
Describing Tiger Base as a death unit, Agu said: “It’s a place where people do not have regard for human life, and for people’s liberty. What happens there is not policing. Those of them in Tiger Base are richer than some politicians.”
A retired security officer, who asked not to be named because of the sensitive nature of the issue, attested to the abuse of spyware facilities by security operatives on suspects.
The source said specific abuses include using trackers to arrest people without warrants or evidence, and using spyware to intimidate critics, journalists, and activists. Other methods include forced confessions with torture and leveraging surveillance footage and tapping phones to arrest and extort individuals or their families.
Findings reveal that surveillance equipment used by security agencies, including the police, to intercept calls includes Pegasus, a sophisticated military-grade spyware developed by the Israeli cyber firm NSO Group. Sold to governments for law enforcement intelligence, it can intercept calls, messages, and track locations. When surreptitiously installed on victims’ phones, it allows an attacker complete access to the device’s messages, emails, media, microphone, camera, calls and contacts.
Another one is Fin Spy, which can also intercept calls, messages, emails, and track device location. Also called Fin Fisher, it is a commercial spyware suite sold by the German-UK firm Gamma Group to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Like Pegasus, Fin Spy infects phones and computers, capturing calls, texts, and locations.
Aside from allegations of rights violations, surveillance gadgets meant to enhance law enforcement capabilities were said to have been used by Tiger Base to monitor, track and arrest innocent citizens. Such gadgets include CCTV cameras, drones, GPS tracking systems, mobile interception and social media monitoring tools. They were allegedly used to locate individuals, extract information or coerce confessions. Surveillance was also believed to be used to monitor and pressure individuals or families, as alleged in cases of extortion and enforced disappearances.
A report by Citizen Lab in 2020 showed that the Nigerian government purchased surveillance equipment to spy on the mobile calls and short message service (SMS) of Nigerians.
In the report, titled “Running in Circles: Uncovering the Clients of Cyberespionage Firm Circles,” the Nigerian Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and other unspecified entities in Nigeria had acquired the equipment from Circles, a cybersecurity company founded by an Israeli with affiliation with the NSO groups, to exploit flaws in telecommunications systems and to access calls, SMS and location services.
“Our scanning identified two Circle systems in Nigeria. One system may be operated by the same entity as one of the Nigerian customers of the FinFisher spyware that we detected in December 2014,” part of the report stated.
TABLE-1TABLE-2TABLE-3From top to bottom: Tables 1-4 showing spyware purchase into Nigeria for the Police, State governments and others; SOURCE: Security Playbook of Digital Authoritarianism in Nigeria-2021 Report
What to know about Tiger Base
Initially known as the anti-kidnapping unit of the Imo State Police command, Tiger Base, as it is notoriously called, was established in 2011 to combat kidnapping, armed robbery, cultism, and other violent crimes in the state. The then Commissioner of Police in Imo State, Danjuma Aboki, who announced the unit’s creation, cited the need to tackle security challenges in the state. Aboki stated that it would make significant strides in tackling security challenges by reducing kidnapping, armed robbery, and other violent crimes.
Experts speak on legal requirements for use of surveillance equipment
The Nigerian Constitution and Freedom of Information Act 2011 provide for the protection of civic freedoms (rights to free expression, assembly, association and personal privacy) and legalise free access to public information to citizens.
Section 37 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution specifically protects the privacy of the telephone conversation and telegraphic communication of citizens without interference.
Chinedu Agu, a legal practitioner and rights activist, said surveillance by security agents is proper only when it is lawful, necessary, proportionate and clearly backed by a statutory or court order.
“Once it becomes secret fishing, political intimidation, warrantless interception or monitoring without accountability, it stops being security work and starts looking like abuse of power,” Agu said, adding that in Nigeria, that line matters because “the constitution protects privacy, and even cybercrime enforcement powers must be exercised with due regard to that right.”
He noted further: “No surveillance should be intrusive; it must conform to the fundamental human rights of individuals.”
21st Century security and policing is technologically driven, but should not be abused: Alobi, former FCT Police Commissioner
Lawrence Alobi, a retired Police Commissioner in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), said surveillance equipment is not expected to be used by security agents to hound innocent citizens or perceived enemies.
“Twenty-first-century security and policing are technologically driven because crime is becoming very sophisticated. For instance, the mounting of CCT cameras at police commands is meant to capture images and information on crimes committed so that, at the end of the day, it will be reviewed and possibly presented in court.
“The cameras are not meant to hound citizens or perceived enemies,” Alobi said, adding that the Tiger Base unit was not expected to be a threat but work professionally in accordance with its mandate. “They should operate within professional standards because they are funded with taxpayers’ money. Allegations of misuse of spyware equipment by them should be looked into.”
An Abuja-based security expert, Kabiru Adamu, acknowledged the need to use surveillance equipment by security agencies in Nigeria, noting that the lack of oversight on the part of the legislature was responsible for abuse.
Adamu said: “Every government tries to have capabilities for technical surveillance. That means it’s a requirement for mostly the intelligence communities in every government. I would say Nigeria is not doing anything exceptional in attempting to obtain surveillance capabilities, especially given the current security challenges.
Kabiru Adamu: Lack of legislative oversight is responsible for spyware abuse by security operatives
“As far back as under the Buhari administration, we scrutinised certain components of the budget, especially the intelligence community, and what was apparent was that there were aspects for obtaining surveillance capabilities within those budgets, and this continued into this administration.”
According to him, with the doctrine of separation of powers, the legislature should have the capacity for oversight and ask critical questions regarding the procurement and usage of those items.
“Unfortunately, what we haven’t seen in Nigeria is the doctrine of separation of powers supporting democratic usage of that equipment. In fact, it is not on record that the legislature, the relevant committees, statutory committees, and standing committees within the two chambers have ever, at least to the knowledge of the public, asked questions regarding those procurements and the usage of the items,” he said.
Digital authoritarianism in Nigeria
In December 2021, a report titled: Security Playbook of Digital Authoritarianism in Nigeria revealed how the massive financial resources, equipment, and technologies originally procured in the name of counter terrorism and curbing insecurity in Nigeria were diverted to monitor the movement of citizens, track the activities of civic actors online, intercept private communication, restrict online civic space, and limit the ability of civic actors.
According to the report, the popular tactics included legal restrictions, misuse of surveillance technologies, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, Internet Protocol (IP) blocking, internet shutdown, biometric data collection, and social media bans.
Others comprised spying on citizens, including activists, opposition politicians, and coordinated cyber-attacks, especially hacking of the servers and websites of media and civil society watchdogs.
Lawful use of surveillance equipment in Nigeria
Actually, Nigerian laws contain specific provisions that permit the state and security agencies to access, track or monitor citizens’ communications. However, this is only allowed under certain conditions and legal frameworks. These powers are meant to operate within limits set by law and the Constitution.
Section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to privacy of citizens’ homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and communications.
However, Section 45 allows the government to restrict rights, including privacy, when it is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society for purposes like defence, public safety, public order, or protecting the rights of others.
This implies that communications are legally private but can be lawfully limited if another written law authorises interference under specific conditions.
Also, Sections 146 to 148 of the Nigerian Communications Act (2003) require telecom companies to develop interception capabilities and allow interception when ordered by the NCC or an authorised officer.
The Act empowers the Nigeria Communications Commission (NCC), in the interest of public safety or national security, to order telecom operators to intercept private communications and disclose data to authorised officers.
Authorised Agencies, such as the State Security Service, the Office of the National Security Adviser, Nigeria Police Force, can intercept communications with a court-issued warrant. This can be done for national security, preventing or investigating a crime, public safety or emergencies, or the economic well-being of citizens.
Nigeria as Africa’s leading customer of surveillance contracts– Research
Research published September 27, 2023, by the Institute of Development Studies and the African Digital Rights Network described Nigeria as Africa’s largest customer of surveillance technology contracts, spending hundreds of millions of dollars annually, and at least US$2.7 billion on known contracts between 2013 and 2022. This is the equivalent of $12 per Nigerian citizen.
The report titled ‘Mapping the Supply of Surveillance Technologies to Africa’, reveals that surveillance technology was used to spy on peaceful activists, opposition politicians, and journalists, singling them out for harassment, arrest and torture, in violation of international human rights law and supplier companies’ own self-policing measures
The researchers reveal that Nigeria is a leading customer of every major surveillance technology they studied, including internet and mobile interception, social media monitoring, biometric ID data and the so-called ‘safe city’ monitoring of citizens in public spaces. They also found that the Nigerian state permits far more government agencies to conduct surveillance than the other countries studied. The nation also has contracts with each of the leading surveillance technology suppliers based in the US, China, EU, UK and Israel.
Budgetary allocations on surveillance
Over the years, federal and state governments have doubled budgetary allocations, public spending, and procurements of invasive technologies and communications systems. This has been justified as a bid to rout unabating terrorism, banditry, cybercrimes and other forms of organised crimes in the country.
2021 Supplementary budget of security agencies for communication surveillance. SOURCE: Security Playbook of Digital Authoritarianism in Nigeria-2021 Report
Although these massive acquisitions are made in the name of security, huge disparities continue to exist between the stated official motivations and their actual use for advancing purely political agendas, corrupt enrichment, and fostering a climate of digital repression.
Findings show that as state governments were amassing spying and hacking devices to achieve political ends, the federal government also intensified its digitalised undercover activities through humongous budgetary provisions and acquisition of sophisticated surveillance hardware and software developed for counter-terrorism purposes.
Countering terrorism, especially the Boko Haram-led terrorist activities in north-eastern Nigeria, provides states with the safest legal justification for these acquisitions. Whereas federal agencies are making heavy policy and resource commitments for a similar purpose. For instance, the 2013 budget included provisions for the purchase of a Wise Intelligence Network Harvest Analyzer System, Open-Source Internet Monitoring System and Personal Internet Surveillance System at a cost of N9.496 billion ($61.26 million). Between 2011 and 2021, government security agencies budgeted at least N104.46 billion for tracing and monitoring communication systems.
In 2021, the National Assembly approved the procurement of N4.87 billion worth of surveillance technologies “to intercept Thuraya mobile calls and solution” and WhatsApp’s voice and text messages. In the 2021 supplementary budget, the federal legislature also approved the request of N7.46 billion from Nigeria’s Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) to launch a purported “independent lawful interception platform – voice and advanced data monitoring”. These supplementary budgetary provisions are additions to the N30.82 billion originally budgeted for in the 2021 budget.
Security agencies’ budget on surveillance (2011-2021). Source: Security Playbook of Digital Authoritarianism in Nigeria-2021 Report
Last year, the Federal Government allocated a substantial N4.91 trillion to security and defence for the year, focusing on retaking control of “ungoverned spaces” in the northern parts of the country.
Part of the budget was reportedly earmarked for the modernisation of the Nigerian Police Force and acquiring advanced equipment, boosting intelligence operations, and implementing community-driven policing strategies.
A scrutiny of the 2026 federal budget revealed that N213.2 million was earmarked for surveillance equipment.
This was captured under the procurement and Installation of Video Security Surveillance System, Provision of Automation E-Pabx Intercom, including Console Equipment, Solar Power Back Up System in all Police State Commands Nationwide.
Also, N1.5 billion was budgeted for the provision of Cyber Security Tools & Solutions/Renewal of Annual Licence, while N287.9 million was earmarked for the procurement of Operational Equipment for PMF Squadrons Nationwide.
Additionally, a whopping N11 billion was budgeted for the “purchase of security equipment”, with an additional N48.8 million earmarked for the provision of Ballistic Guard Booths (with Surveillance and Proximity Devices) for Police and Zonal Headquarters
A scrutiny of the Imo State 2026 budget also revealed that the State Ministry of Homeland Security and Vigilante Affairs was allocated the sum of N500 million for the Purchase and Installation of 100 No. CCTV Cameras for Police Services across the state.
Imo Police Command evades ICIR’s inquiries
On March 26, 2026, The ICIR reached out to the Imo State Police Command via telephone to respond to findings and allegations against Tiger Base. The command’s Public Relations Officer, Henry Okoye, a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), promised to secure an appointment with the State Police Commissioner for the reporter. He also promised to facilitate an interview with the Tiger Base Commander.
However, on the scheduled date, the reporter waited for over five hours at the PPRO’s office. When he eventually showed up, he asked the reporter to come back the next day. The reporter was in his office the following day. After waiting for another two hours, he failed to take the reporter to the police commissioner as promised. He stopped responding to the reporter’s calls thereafter.
Allegations mere propaganda, says Tiger Base commander
Also, when contacted on the phone, Tiger Base Commander, Oladimeji Odeyeyiwa, dismissed allegations of human rights abuses against his unit, describing them as mere ‘propaganda.’ He, however, declined to speak further, saying, “Right now, I am in the market.”
Subsequent calls to secure an appointment with him were unanswered.
The ICIR reports that on Friday, December 5, 2025, the Imo State Police command led journalists on what it described as ‘an open door, guided tour of the Tiger Base, in Owerri.
Odedeyiwa, along with the PPRO Okoye, who briefed the journalists at the end of the visit, described allegations of rights violations against the unit as baseless and intended to mislead the public.
The commander said Tiger Base remained a legitimate tactical formation of the Nigeria Police Force, mandated to combat kidnapping, armed robbery, cultism, and other violent crimes.
He, however, said the facility was equipped with CCTV cameras strategically installed across its premises, with real-time footage linked to the office of the Commissioner of Police to ensure continuous monitoring and accountability.
”The entire environment is secured with barbed wire fencing, CCTV surveillance, and no surrounding bushes,” he reportedly said, adding, “We have functional sectional offices, disciplinary units, the IGP Monitoring Unit, X Squad, and an active Complaint Response Unit, CRU.”
The Commander said the unit focuses exclusively on high-profile cases, including armed robbery, murder, kidnapping, and terrorism. “We have newly built and commissioned charge rooms, and our tactical teams remain on standby to ensure the continued security of Imo State,” he reportedly stated.
